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STUDENT NOTES
THE MODERN FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE
Since the earliest times, murder convictions for unintentional homi-
cide resulting from an unlawful act have been the subject of much
criticism. There have been a number of limitations placed on the
felony murder rule,' and it is the purpose of this note to discuss their
effect.
In the Institutes,2 Coke expressed the rule as he conceived it to be
in his day by saying, "If the act be unlawful, it is murder." Thus, if
one accidentally killed another in the commission of any misdemeanor
or felony, he was as a matter of law guilty of murder. Coke's doctrine,
however, was apparently never accepted.3 Being considered too harsh
it was limited to acts which were felonious. 4 With this limitation,
namely, that a homicide produced during the commission of a felony
was murder, the felony murder rule stood until the famous case of
Regina v. Serne5 was decided in the year 1883.
Regina v. &erne imposed an important limitation on the felony
murder rule. In his decision of the case, Stephen, J., said: "I think
that, instead of saying that any act done with intent to commit a felony
and which causes death amounts to murder, it would be reasonable to
say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to
cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused
death, should be murder." A majority of the American courts in
Interpreting this limitation, say that as a matter of law certain felonies
are dangerous to life, and if a homicide results during the commission
I At common law, murder was homicide with malice aforethought.
Malice aforethought consisted of any of the following states of mind:
"(a) An Intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to
any person, whether such person is the person actually killed
or not.
(b) Knowledge that the act or omission which causes death will
probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some
person, whether such person is the person actually killed or
not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference
whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by
a wish that it may not be caused.
(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever. (Italics supplied.)
(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice in arresting
or keeping in custody a person when he has a right to arrest
or keep in custody, or in keeping the peace." 3 Stephen, His-
tory of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 22.
23 Coke, Institutes (1680) 56.
' Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York (1938), 6 Fordham Law
Rev. 43, 52.
' Rex v. Plummer, 84 Eng. Reprints 1103 (1701).
516 Cox, C.C. 311 (1887).
616 Cox, C.C. 311, 313 (1887).
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of such felony, the felon is guilty of murder7 These courts do not take
into consideration the manner in which the supposedly dangerous
felony is committed, and they entirely disregard the nature of the act
causing the death. Accordingly, one who unintentionally kills another
in the commission of a dangerous felony is guilty of murder.
A few hypothetical cases may help to show the harsh propensi-
ties of the American view. W, X. Y. and Z, with intent to defraud an
insurance company, set fire to a country dwelling house after a thorough
search for occupants. The four men stand guard, one at each corner,
to keep anyone from entering. M, a tramp intending to steal some
food, knocks X unconscious, goes into the house, and is burned to
death. Under the above rule, the four men would be guilty of murder.
Again, suppose that X, a young college boy badly in need of fifty dollars,
enters the home of his good friend at three o'clock in the morning with
intent to steal that sum. Realizing that he might become frightened
and hurt someone if he went into the house armed, he enters unarmed,
goes upstairs, and takes fifty dollars. In making his exit, X jumps
from a second story window landing on a tramp, who has "passed out"
under a shrub, and kills him. As in the first case, X would be guilty
of murder, for he has killed another while perpetrating a felony danger-
ous to life.
The explanation for the presence of the felony murder doctrine is
that it was smuggled into the common law, and that no objections were
originally made because always the underlying felony during which
the homicide was committed was itself punishable by death, and it was
immaterial on what grounds the felon was hanged. 8 The theory behind
the doctrine is the punishment of the felon for his evil intent. Because
he intended 'to commit a felony and had an evil mind, he should be
guilty of murder if he killed another in the commission of the felony,
regardless of the nature of the act causing the death. Such a theory
has been outmoded by a change in the basic purpose of our criminal
law. The purpose of our criminal law todaY is to protect society from
certain external acts, and the punishment is measured in accordance
with the risk to the general security of the public.' The manner in
7People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, 22 Pac. 125 (1889); Reddick v. Com-
monwealth, 17- Ky. Law Rep. 1020, 33 S.W. 416 (1895); Commonwealth
v. Lessner, 274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922); Commonwealth v. McManus,
282 Pa. 25, 127 Atl. 316 (1925); Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder
Doctrine and Its Application under the New York Statutes (1935), 20
Cornell L.Q. 288, 291; Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York (1938), 6
Fordham Law Rev. 43, 52.
'See 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883)
57-74.
'"So, if a man does an act with intent to commit a felony, and
thereby accidentally kills another; for instance, if he fires at chickens,
intending to steal them, and accidentally kills the owner, whom he does
not see. Such a case as this last seems hardly to be reconciled with
the general principles which have been laid down. It has been argued
somewhat as follows: The only blameworthy act is firing at the
chickens, knowing them to belong to another. It is neither more nor
less so because an accident happens afterwards; and hitting a man,
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which the felonies in the above hypothetical cases were committed was
such as to render them not dangerous to life and likely to cause death,
and the fact that the defendants were committing a felony should be
entirely disregarded. The courts should consider the act as a whole
and determine in each case whether or not it was dangerous to life and
likely in itself to cause death.
The courts in England" and a few of the American jurisdictions"
have followed exactly the limitation as laid down in the case of Regina
v. ,Serne by placing the emphasis on the act done in the commission of
the felony. In these jurisdictions the felons in the above hypothetical
cases would not be held for murder, for, aside from the fact that the
felony is one which is generally considered dangerous to life, the act
done in the commission of the felony must be dangerous to life and
likely in Itself to cause death." It is submitted that this is the better
rule.
The similarity of the felony murder doctrine with the last limita-
tion, and (B) of Stephen's analysis" is apparent. Under (B), Stephen
says that one is guilty of murder if he kills another while committing
an act which will probably cause the death of someone even though it
is accompanied by a wish that it will not. Have not the English courts
and the minority of American jurisdictions by their interpretation of
the case of Regina v. Serne done away with the need of the felony
murder doctrine? Can not a conviction for murder for a homicide
resulting from the commission of a felony be obtained under (B) of
Stephen's analysis? It is submitted that the answer to these questions
is in the affirmative. First, as the courts have required that the act be
one likely to cause death, the standard of conduct has become the same
whose presence could not have been suspected, is an accident. The fact
that the shooting is felonious does not make it any more likely to kill
people. If the object of the rule is to prevent such accidents, it should
make accidental killing with firearms murder, not accidental killing in
the effort to steal; while, if its object is to prevent stealing, it would do
better to hang one thief in every thousand by the lot." Holmes, The
Common Law (1881), 57-58. "Our modern objective tends more and
more, in the direction, not of awarding adequate punishment for moral
wrongdoing, but of protecting social and public interests." Sayre,
Mens Rea (1932), 45 Har. L.R. 974, 1017; "As the aim of the law is not
to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external results." Common-
wealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1906).
"I "Where a person whilst committing or attempting to commit a
felony does an act which is known to be dangerous to life and likely
in itself to cause death, and the death of another person results as a
consequence of that act though not intended by the person committing
it, the law implies malice aforethought, and the person causing the
the death is guilty of murder." 9 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed.,
1933) 437.
21 State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W. (2d) 1049 (1932); Pliemling
v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N.W. 278 (1879).
"Division of Public Prosecution v. Beard, (1920) A.C. 470; Rex v.
Lumley, 22 Cox, C.C. 635 (1911); Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516,
1 N.W. 278, 279 (1879).
"Supra n. 1.
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as under (B) of Stephen's analysis. Secondly, if there is any difference
in the two standards, the requirements for a conviction under the
felony murder doctrine are higher; for under this rule the courts
require that the act be done for the purpose of committing a felony,
while under (B) illegality of the act is not material.
It is submitted that the explanation for the fact that the courts
cling to the outmoded felony doctrine is their fondness for "pegs" upon
which to base their convictions. It is also submitted that it would be
expedient for the courts to entirely abolish the doctrine and obtain
their convictions for unintentional homicides resulting from the com-
mission of a felony under (B) of Stephen's analysis. Such would not
be a revolutionary step in our criminal law, for (D) of Stephen's analy-
sis has been entirely abolished, and the courts are now basing their
convictions on (B) of his analysis. ' There is also a marked tendency
in the late decisions to abolish the rule that one shall be guilty of
involuntary manslaughter if he accidentally kills another while in the
commission of an act "malum in se.""5
To summarize, it has been shown that the felony murder doctrine
as followed by a majority of the American jurisdictions is entirely too
harsh and has been outmoded by the trend toward objectiveness in the
law of homicides; and that the courts in England and a few American
jurisdictions have in reality done away with the usefulness of the doc-
trine by setting up in effect the same standard as found in (B) of
Stephen's analysis. It is submitted that the courts should formally
abolish the felony murder doctrine and accept (B) of Stephen's analysis
to base their convictions for homicide resulting from the commission of
a felony. J.G. CLAr
THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE DISTINGUISHED FROM
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The felony murder doctrine of the ancient English common law
would sustain a conviction of murder when the perpetrator of any
felony caused a homicide to occur during the perpetration of the
felony.' During these early years the only felonies that existed were
14See Perkins, RationaZe of Men3 Rea (1939), 52 Har. L.R. 905,
915-19.
IsPeople v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177 (1921).
,At common law, murder was homicide with malice aforethought.
Malice aforethought consisted of any of the following states of mind:
1. An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to,
any person, whether such person is the person killed or not.
2. Knowledge that the act or omission which causes death will
probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to some person,
whether the person killed or another, although, such knowledge is
accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is
caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
3. An intent to commit any felony whatever.
4. An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice in arresting
